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PACIFIC BELL v. LINKLINE: PRICE
SQUEEZING AND THE LIMITS OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRABILITY
SANDEEP VAHEESAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2007, a Ninth Circuit panel held in Pacific Bell
Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., that linkLine’s “price
squeeze” claim against Pacific Bell stated a valid cause of action
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (“Section 2”).1 As DSL providers,
linkLine and the other respondents (“linkLine”) purchased wholesale
network access (“DSL transport”) from Pacific Bell and competed
against Pacific Bell in the retail DSL market. linkLine alleged that
Pacific Bell had raised the price of DSL transport and concurrently
lowered the price of its retail DSL to squeeze linkLine’s profit
margins and drive it out of the California market.2 The court rejected
Pacific Bell’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and found that
linkLine’s price squeeze claim survived the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko,3 which held
that Verizon’s alleged violation of a statutory duty to deal was not a
4
cause of action under Section 2. On June 23, 2008, the Supreme Court

* 2010 J.D./M.A. (Economics) Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 877 (9th Cir. 2007); 15
U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2008) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony
. . . .”).
2. linkLine, 503 F.3d at 877–78.
3. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 416 (2004).
4. See linkLine, 503 F.3d at 883 (“First, as the Eleventh Circuit has underscored, Trinko
did not involve a price squeezing theory. Indeed, Trinko took great care to explain that in this
particular regulatory context, ‘claims that satisfy established antitrust standards’ are preserved.
Because a price squeeze theory formed part of the fabric of traditional antitrust law prior to
Trinko, those claims should remain viable notwithstanding either the telecommunications
statutes or Trinko.” (citations omitted)).
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granted Pacific Bell’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling.5
II. FACTS
“Broadband” internet, with its high download speeds and
reliability, is the most popular means of accessing the internet among
6
residential and commercial customers. Digital subscriber lines
(“DSL”) are among the most popular forms of broadband and offer
7
reception speeds about fifty times faster than dialup connections.
Unlike other forms of broadband, DSL can be provided over existing
telephone infrastructure.8 Pacific Bell provides retail DSL service to
9
residential and commercial customers. Pacific Bell also owns the
“last-mile” connections in most of California; these lines run from
Pacific Bell’s central offices to customers’ homes or offices. These
“last-mile” connections, because of their natural monopoly
characteristics, are considered “essential” facilities.10 Because they do
not own the last mile connections necessary to reach customers, nonaffiliated DSL providers, like linkLine, must purchase DSL transport,
i.e., access to last-mile connections, from Pacific Bell.11 To ensure that
incumbents such as Pacific Bell do not abuse their control of essential
facilities and extend their monopolies to downstream markets such as
retail DSL, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has
enacted a series of regulations under the Communications Act of
1934.12 FCC rules require that landline phone monopolies that
provide DSL service must also provide DSL transport to nonaffiliated providers on a non-discriminatory basis.13
linkLine alleged that, in spite of the FCC’s regulatory regime,
Pacific Bell abused its ownership and control of essential facilities in

5. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 503 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
128 S. Ct. 2957 (June 23, 2008) (No. 07-512).
6. Joint Appendix at 15, linkLine, 128 S. Ct. 2957 (No. 07-512).
7. Id. at 15–16.
8. Id. at 15.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: A Principle in Need of Some Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989) (“A single firm’s facility . . . is ‘essential’ only when it is both critical
to the plaintiff’s competitive vitality and the plaintiff is essential for competition in the
marketplace. ‘Critical to the plaintiff's competitive vitality’ means that the plaintiff cannot
compete effectively without it and that duplication or practical alternatives are not available.”).
11. Id.
12. Brief for Petitioner at 5, linkLine, 128 S. Ct. 2957 (No. 07-512).
13. Id. at 3.
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violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.14 Specifically, linkLine
claimed that Pacific Bell charged independent Internet Service
Providers (“ISPs”) “wholesale prices that were too high in relation to
prices at which [Pacific Bell was] providing retail DSL services and
necessary equipment to end-user customers,” as part of a so-called
price squeeze strategy.15 According to linkLine, Pacific Bell charged
retail prices that were, on occasion, lower than the amount linkLine
16
paid to Pacific Bell for DSL transport. The respondents asserted that
if they matched Pacific Bell’s retail prices, they would not be able to
17
cover their costs of providing service. Similarly, linkLine contended
that Pacific Bell would not be able to earn a profit on its retail service
if Pacific Bell were paying the same wholesale prices as the
18
respondents. Through this strategy, linkLine argued, Pacific Bell
sought to eliminate profit margins for non-affiliated DSL providers to
drive them out of the market and to establish a monopoly in the retail
DSL service market.19
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Ninth Circuit based its ruling that linkLine’s price squeeze
claim stated a valid Section 2 cause of action on a long line of cases
dating back to 1945. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(“Alcoa”), the Second Circuit explained the mechanics of an
20
anticompetitive price squeeze. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison
21
22
Co. and City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co.
examined the intersection of antitrust and regulation in the context of
electricity and stressed that the presence of regulation reduces or
even removes the need for antitrust remedies.23 In cases with fact
patterns virtually identical to those in linkLine, both the D.C.24 and
the Eleventh25 Circuits recently considered price squeeze claims and
denied relief to the plaintiffs. Lastly, although it did not directly
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 17–18.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 38.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 30–31 (1st Cir. 1990).
City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id.
Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1050 (11th Cir. 2004).
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address price squeezes, the Supreme Court’s holding in Verizon
Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko must be considered
in any case at the intersection of antitrust and regulation.
A. Alcoa: The Progenitor of Price Squeezes
In Alcoa, defendant Alcoa was an unregulated firm that produced
aluminum ingot, manufactured aluminum sheet using the ingot, and
sold its ingot to other sheet rollers.26 The government claimed, inter
alia, that Alcoa raised the price of ingot it sold to rival sheet rollers
and concurrently slashed the price of the sheet it produced.27 The
Second Circuit held that three elements must be satisfied for a
successful price squeeze claim: 1) the firm conducting the squeeze has
monopoly power at the first industry level; 2) its price at the first level
is higher than a “fair price”; and 3) its price at the second level is so
low that its competitors cannot match the price and still make “living
profits.”28 The court found that Alcoa met the first element by
29
monopolizing the market for aluminum ingot. Upon an examination
of aluminum ingot and sheet price data, the court also found that
Alcoa’s pricing practices had deprived rival sheet makers of a “living
profit,” thereby meeting the third element of the test.30 This practice
forced rival sheet manufacturers to leave the industry, thereby
establishing the second element that Alcoa sold ingot to rivals at
“higher than a ‘fair price.’”31
B. Price Squeezes in Fully Regulated Industries
In Town of Concord and in City of Anaheim, the defendants were
franchised utilities that generated, transmitted, and distributed
electricity and that owned the entire relevant infrastructure.32 The
plaintiffs were municipally-owned distribution companies that
purchased power from the defendants and “wheeled” power from
other generators over the defendants’ transmission lines.33 The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state public utility
26. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 436.
27. Id. at 437–38.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 438.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1990); City of
Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1992).
33. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 20; City of Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1376.
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commissions regulated the defendants at the wholesale and retail
levels, respectively.34 The municipalities alleged that, in spite of this
comprehensive regulatory oversight, the defendants had manipulated
35
their regulatory filings to eliminate the plaintiffs’ profit margins.
In Town of Concord, the First Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s price
squeeze claim, basing its ruling on the presence of comprehensive
regulation. In dicta, the court described the economics of price
squeezing, which are not always anticompetitive and, in fact, can be
36
procompetitive. First, by driving out less efficient independent
competitors in the downstream market, price squeezes can save
economic resources so that they can be used elsewhere in a more
productive capacity.37 Second, when independent monopolies exist at
the upstream and the downstream levels, price squeezes can increase
consumer welfare.38 Under this ‘vertical separation,’ monopoly
markups are added at each stage of production; consequently,
39
consumers pay a higher final price. The replacement of the two
independent monopolies by a single integrated monopoly can
eliminate this so-called double marginalization problem.40
On the other hand, price squeezes can also have anticompetitive
effects. First, they can eliminate downstream rivals and thus reduce
non-price competition, which is an important competitive dimension
in many industries.41 Second, a price squeeze permits the upstream
monopolist to extend its monopoly power into the downstream
market; this reduces the likelihood of a new competitor successfully
entering the market and so fortifies the monopolist’s existing market
power.42 Given the ambiguous effects of price squeezes, only a
detailed factual inquiry can determine the exact consumer welfare
effects of a specific allegation of price squeezing.
Because both levels of the market were regulated, the court in
Town of Concord reasoned that these administrative processes can
43
prevent anticompetitive price squeezes. Although the court stressed

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 20; City of Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1375.
Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 20–21; City of Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1376.
Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 23.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
Id.
LUIS M.B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 190–92 (2000).
Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24.
Id.
Id. at 25.
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that institutional considerations required it to deny this plaintiff’s
claim, it did not categorically reject all price squeeze claims.44 The
court held only that full regulation bars price squeeze claims,45 and
that price squeeze claims in unregulated or partly regulated industries
46
may still warrant antitrust scrutiny.
In contrast to the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in City of
Anaheim, held that the mere presence of full regulatory oversight
47
does not categorically bar price squeeze claims. The court found that
regulation alters the calculus for the judiciary when it considers
antitrust claims, and said that “concerns [of anticompetitive price
squeezes] are attenuated in the electrical industry whose rates are
regulated at both the wholesale and retail levels.”48 The court
reasoned that because of regulatory imperfections, a regulated
monopolist could still “manipulate its filings . . . in a manner that
causes a, at least temporary, squeeze which might be just as effective
as one perpetrated by an unregulated actor.”49 To prevent antitrust
from unduly encroaching on the territory of regulation, the court
required plaintiffs to prove specific intent when alleging price
squeezes in regulated environments.50 The City of Anaheim’s price
squeeze claim was rejected because the court found that Edison was
legitimately maximizing its own profits, not improperly forcing the
plaintiff out of the retail distribution business.51
C. Price Squeezes in the DSL Market
The D.C. Circuit in Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic
Corp. and the Eleventh Circuit in Covad Communications Co. v.
BellSouth Corp., each considered allegations essentially identical to
those of linkLine.52 In both cases, a vertically-integrated DSL provider
allegedly raised the price of DSL transport and simultaneously
53
reduced the price of its retail DSL.

44. Id. at 29.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1992).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1378.
51. Id. at 1379.
52. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Covad
Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1050 (11th Cir. 2004).
53. Bell Atlantic, 398 F.3d at 673; BellSouth, 374 F.3d at 1050.
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In Bell Atlantic, the D.C. Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Trinko barred price squeezes.54 Swiftly dismissing Covad’s
price squeeze claim, the court stated that “it makes no sense to
prohibit a predatory price squeeze in circumstances where the
integrated monopolist is free to refuse to deal.”55 In BellSouth, the
Eleventh Circuit ostensibly allowed Covad’s price squeeze claim to
56
proceed. The court, however, confused price squeezing with
predatory pricing, two similar-sounding practices that are clearly
distinguishable from each other. The focus in a predatory pricing
claim is on the defendant’s pricing conduct; in a price squeezing claim,
the focus is on how the defendant’s conduct reduced or eliminated the
plaintiff’s profit margins. The Eleventh Circuit described Covad’s
claim as a price squeeze and yet applied the test for predatory
pricing.57 The court allowed Covad’s claim to survive summary
judgment because it satisfied the two-prong test for predation set out
in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.: 1)
BellSouth priced its DSL below an appropriate measure of its costs;
and 2) BellSouth had a dangerous probability of recovering its losses
from the below-cost pricing.58 Covad’s claim survived BellSouth’s
motion to dismiss because it met the criteria for a predatory pricing
claim, not because it met the criteria for price squeezing.
D. Trinko: The Intersection Between Antitrust and Regulation
In the Supreme Court’s landmark Trinko decision, the respondent
alleged that Verizon had, inter alia, failed to provide a landline
telephone rival with adequate access to its network,59 and that
Verizon’s breach of its statutory duty to share also constituted a
violation of Section 2.60 The Supreme Court held that Verizon’s refusal
to deal with a rival in the landline telephone market was not an
61
antitrust violation. An underpinning of the Court’s decision was the
FCC’s regulatory oversight of Verizon.62 The Court reasoned that the
54. Bell Atlantic, 398 F.3d at 673.
55. Id. (citing 3A PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 129 (2d
ed. 2002)).
56. BellSouth, 374 F.3d at 1050.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1051 (citing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 222 (1993)).
59. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 404–05 (2004).
60. Id. at 405.
61. Id. at 415.
62. Id. at 411–13.
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FCC’s oversight reduced the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct
and found that, in fact, the regulatory regime had worked as intended
in this particular instance.63 Because of this regulatory structure, the
marginal benefit of Section 2 liability as a “backstop” against
anticompetitive conduct would be slight and therefore did not
warrant incurring the potentially significant administrative and error
64
costs associated with antitrust litigation.
IV. HOLDING
In Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit rejected Pacific Bell’s motion to dismiss and held that
price squeeze allegations in partially-regulated industries do state a
valid cause of action under Section 2.65 The court held that price
squeezes are consistent with Trinko and with a significant body of
66
appellate-level rulings. The majority’s opinion elicited a strong
dissent from Judge Ronald Gould.67
The majority emphasized that Trinko did not involve price
squeezes and that the Supreme Court “took great care to explain that
in this particular regulatory context, ‘claims that satisfy established
68
antitrust standards’ are preserved.” The majority found that the
Trinko court—though it stressed the existence of a regulatory
structure when it rejected the plaintiff’s claim—did not hold that
regulation was a per se bar on antitrust claims.69 Rather, the existence
of a regulatory structure was just “one factor of particular
70
importance” for a court to consider when deciding antitrust matters.

63. Id. at 413 (“The regulatory response to the OSS failure complained of in respondent's
suit provides a vivid example of how the regulatory regime operates. When several competitive
LECs complained about deficiencies in Verizon's servicing of orders, the FCC and PSC
responded.”).
64. Id. at 414 (“Against the slight benefits of antitrust intervention here, we must weigh a
realistic assessment of its costs. Under the best of circumstances, applying the requirements of §
2 ‘can be difficult’ because ‘the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate
competition, are myriad.’” (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir.
2001))).
65. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2007).
66. Id. at 883.
67. Id. at 885.
68. Id. at 883 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S.
398, 406 (2004)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit then looked to how other circuits had applied
Trinko to price squeeze claims, but found no definitive guidance.71
The court also saw no need to reconsider its City of Anaheim v.
Southern California Edison Co. ruling in light of Trinko. Both City of
Anaheim and Trinko viewed regulation as an important factor, but not
72
a dispositive one, when a court ruled on an antitrust claim. Although
City of Anaheim urged caution before imposing antitrust liability on a
regulated company, the court also acknowledged that price squeezes
could arise even in fully regulated sectors because of deceptive and
73
fraudulent rate filings. The court held that if price squeezes could be
implemented in fully-regulated sectors they could, by implication, also
occur in partially-regulated industries.74 The court underscored that
although wholesale rates are subject to FCC regulation, retail prices
are determined entirely by market forces and face no external
constraint other than the antitrust laws.75
Judge Gould’s dissent argued that Trinko did bar price squeeze
claims because a monopolist that can refuse to deal under the
antitrust laws, by extension, also enjoys complete discretion over
pricing.76 If, however, the plaintiffs could establish a predatory pricing
claim that satisfied the requirements of the Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. test, Judge Gould noted, their
complaint would survive a summary judgment motion.77
V. ANALYSIS
For both economic and institutional-competence reasons, the
Ninth Circuit erred in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine
Communications, Inc., by allowing the plaintiffs’ price squeeze claim
to proceed. First, the court failed to adequately examine the
economics of price squeezing and ignored the possibility that it can be
procompetitive. Second, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling will force the
federal courts to act as direct price administrators, which is a
71. Id. at 881 (“[The Trinko] holding raised the question of whether a price squeeze is
merely another term of the deal governed by the Supreme Court's analysis in Trinko, or
whether it is something else. The D.C. and Eleventh Circuits have offered conflicting answers to
that question.”).
72. Id. at 883.
73. Id. at 883–84.
74. Id. at 884.
75. Id. at 885.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 887.

DO NOT DELETE

12/30/2008 4:56:54 PM

138 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:129

problematic requirement that is especially unnecessary in markets in
which specialized regulatory agencies already perform this function.
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling thus creates the exact situation the Trinko
court sought to avoid: supplementary antitrust remedies that are
likely to provide only slight marginal benefits but that will impose
potentially significant administrative and economic costs.78
A. The Shaky Economic Foundations of the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling
Perhaps because the opinion did not consider Town of Concord v.
Boston Edison Co.,79 the Ninth Circuit did not recognize the uncertain
economic effects of price squeezes. As then-Judge Breyer wrote in
Town of Concord, price squeezes, unlike, for example, collusion, can
have both anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.80 In their
complaint, the linkLine respondents failed to specifically state how
the price squeeze harmed competition, and instead gave only
conclusory statements about the anticompetitive effects on the
81
marketplace. By focusing strictly on the plaintiff’s claims of harm to
itself rather than on harm to the overall competitive process, the court
ignored modern antitrust’s goal of promoting consumer welfare.82
When the court allowed the respondents’ price squeeze claim to
survive Pacific Bell’s motion to dismiss, it disregarded the possibility
that price squeezing can, in fact, be procompetitive. First, price
squeezes can increase consumer surplus in markets in which separate
monopolies exist at the upstream and downstream levels.83 The
upstream monopolist, through a price squeeze, can expand
84
downstream and eliminate the independent downstream monopolist.
Although these price squeezes harm the downstream monopolist,

78. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)
(“Against the slight benefits of antitrust intervention here, we must weigh a realistic assessment
of its costs. Under the best of circumstances, applying the requirements of § 2 ‘can be difficult’
because ‘the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad.’”
quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir 2001))).
79. Town of Concord lays out the economics and institutional considerations in
adjudicating price squeeze claims more thoroughly than any recent court opinion. See supra Part
III.B.
80. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 24–25 (1st Cir. 1990).
81. Brief in Opposition at 1, Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2957
(2007) (No. 07–512).
82. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993)
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
83. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 25.
84. Id.
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they benefit consumers by eliminating the double marginalization
problem whereby consumers have to pay two levels of monopoly
profits.85 The replacement of two independent monopolies with a
86
single monopoly thus results in lower prices. Second, price squeezes
can eliminate inefficient downstream competitors and induce the
reallocation of these economic resources to more productive uses
87
elsewhere. By adopting a permissible stance towards price squeeze
claims, the Ninth Circuit ruling, in some circumstances, frustrates the
possibility of welfare-enhancing conduct.
In addition to potentially preventing efficiency-enhancing vertical
integration and market exit, the threat of price squeeze liability may
also deter procompetitive price cuts at the retail level. Verticallyintegrated firms may worry that if they slash retail prices, they will
invite allegations of price squeezing from downstream competitors.88
Even if they ultimately prevail in court, firms may maintain
supracompetitive retail prices to avoid the significant costs of
defending themselves against such price squeeze claims. Although
these higher retail prices ensure the continued profitability of
downstream competitors, they are unambiguously bad for consumers
and social welfare. The court, in rejecting Pacific Bell’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, returned to the competition policy of the
mid-twentieth century in which antitrust was, according to a leading
scholar, at “war with itself.”89
The court also speciously applied the Trinko ruling. If a
monopolist has no general duty to deal with a rival, it is illogical to
require that it deal under specific terms when it voluntarily chooses to

85.
86.
87.
88.

CABRAL, supra note 40, at 190–92.
Id.
Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24–25.
J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 279, 297 (2008).
89. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7
(1978) (“Certain [antitrust doctrines] preserve competition, while others suppress it, resulting in
a policy at war with itself.”); Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, An Antitrust
Progress Report for the FTC: Past, Present and Future, Remarks Before the Antitrust 1996
Conference (Mar. 4, 1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/speech4.shtm
(“Riding the crest of World War II successes and implementing the pent-up technology of the
1930s and the war years, American industry seemed invincible. In that frame of mind why not
err on the side of preserving large numbers of rivals, and limiting their collaboration? Even if
efficiency or innovation suffered what did that matter?” (quoting Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law
as Industrial Policy: Should Judges and Juries Make It? in ANTITRUST INNOVATION AND
COMPETITIVENESS 35 (Jorde & Teece eds., 1992))).
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deal.90 Such a rule will only deter voluntary dealing in the future, as
courts may impose liability on those transactions because of alleged
price squeezing.91 Instead of dealing (and risking antitrust liability),
vertically-integrated firms with an upstream monopoly may simply
refuse to deal with downstream rivals, or to deal only insofar as
required by regulation.92 Thus, price squeezing, without an affirmative
duty to deal, may have the perverse effect of discouraging welfareenhancing inter-firm dealing.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found a split between the D.C. and
Eleventh Circuits because it misread the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in
BellSouth and failed to appreciate the substantive economic
differences between price squeezing and predatory pricing. The
BellSouth court allowed the price squeeze to proceed if the plaintiff
could satisfy the two-part Brooke Group test, which applies to
93
predatory pricing claims. To establish such claims, the plaintiff must
show that: 1) the defendant priced its product below an appropriate
measure of its costs; and 2) the defendant had a dangerous probability
of recovering its losses from the below-cost pricing.94 In adjudicating
predatory pricing claims, courts look to whether the defendant priced
its product below its own costs. Courts deciding price squeeze claims,
however, consider whether the defendant’s pricing conduct reduced
or eliminated the plaintiff’s profit margins. Given the test it applied,
the Eleventh Circuit legitimately allowed Covad’s complaint to
survive summary judgment as a predatory pricing claim, not as a price
squeezing claim. The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize this semantic
error of its sister circuit and so mistakenly found a decisional split
where none actually existed.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Disregard for Considerations of Institutional
Competence
By allowing the plaintiffs’ complaint to survive summary
judgment, the Ninth Circuit overestimated the institutional
competence of the federal judiciary and underestimated the
capabilities of the FCC. Price squeeze claims typically involve

90. Dennis Carlton, Should “Price Squeeze” Be a Recognized Form of Anticompetitive
Conduct?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271, 276–77 (2008).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1050 (11th Cir. 2004).
94. Id.
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questions of what Judge Learned Hand in Alcoa termed “fair prices”
and “living profits.”95 Even aside from the question of whether finding
liability for price squeezes is good or bad economics, the
determinations necessary to adjudicate these cases are likely beyond
the expertise of the federal courts’ generalist judges. In Town of
Concord, then-Judge Breyer, an expert in antitrust and regulation,
stated as much, conceding that resolving such complex matters was
extremely difficult for federal judges.96 The challenge becomes even
greater when the issue of liability is left to a jury. If price squeeze
cases are decided on the basis of crude intuition, judges and juries risk
condemning price squeezes that are, in fact, procompetitive.
Antitrust and regulation have the same ultimate aims: “low and
economically efficient prices, innovation, and efficient production
methods.”97 In markets in which the antitrust laws are the only
constraint on dominant firms, requiring judges to act as price
regulators may be a necessity, in spite of the institutional
shortcomings of the federal judiciary in this realm. In markets with at
least some regulatory oversight, however, the need for judges to set
prices is much less compelling. Regulatory agencies have both
specialized knowledge of their assigned industry and in-house experts
well-versed in the economics of price regulation.98 Even if
administrative bodies regulate only the upstream market, they may
still be able to consider retail prices, either when prospectively setting
wholesale prices or when retrospectively reviewing the propriety of
99
those prices. Moreover, price regulation, given the inherently
dynamic nature of markets, is an ongoing process—a “fair price”
95. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 436 (2d Cir. 1945).
96. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990) (“But how is a
judge or jury to determine a ‘fair price?’ Is it the price charged by other suppliers of the primary
product? None exist. Is it the price that competition ‘would have set’ were the primary level not
monopolized? How can the court determine this price without examining costs and demands,
indeed without acting like a rate-setting regulatory agency, the rate-setting proceedings of which
often last for several years?”).
97. Id. at 22.
98. See Sidak, supra note 88, at 295 (“In public utility regulation, the price-squeeze issue
arises in proceedings concerning ‘access pricing’ and ‘imputation.’ Extensive economic literature
exists on how regulators would maximize consumer welfare in the pricing of bottleneck inputs
that a vertically integrated monopolist sells to its competitors in a downstream market.”)
(footnote omitted).
99. See id. at 282 (“When the duty to deal arises from regulatory compulsion, rather than
from a prior course of voluntary dealing, and when a regulator has authority to consider
downstream competition in regulating prices charged by a regulated monopolist for access to a
bottleneck input, there is no occasion for a court to consider further the relationship between
the input price and retail prices.”).
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today may not be a “fair price” next week. Although courts are wellsuited to provide one-time remedies such as damages or injunctions,
they are ill-equipped to handle the day-to-day monitoring that price
100
regulation requires. Just as they are better at making the necessary
price determinations, regulatory agencies like the FCC are more
qualified to perform the required daily oversight for price squeeze
remedies than are the federal courts.
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION
A. Strengths & Weaknesses of Pacific Bell’s Case
The strengths of Pacific Bell’s case have largely been described
above. First, its brief accurately points out that the Ninth Circuit
erroneously found a circuit split on the question of price squeezing.101
Although the D.C. Circuit expressly rejected Covad’s price squeeze
claim in Bell Atlantic, the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly described the
plaintiff’s predatory pricing allegations as price squeezing
allegations.102 The former allegations inquire into the defendant’s
profit margins, while the latter examines the plaintiff’s profit margins.
Second, Pacific Bell rightly argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to
allow a price squeeze claim in light of Verizon Communications v.
103
Law Offices of Curtis Trinko was economically unsound. If a
monopolist has no antitrust duty to deal with rivals, requiring it to
deal on court-specified terms will only deter it from engaging in those
voluntary transactions.104
The economics that Pacific Bell used in its brief, though partly
correct, neglected the possible harms of price squeezes. Imposing
liability for price squeezes can have anticompetitive effects. For
example, liability can deter price cutting and efficiency-enhancing
105
vertical integration. Price squeezes, however, can reduce consumer
welfare under certain conditions. They, for instance, can eliminate

100. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004) (“An
antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective day-to-day enforcer of these detailed sharing
obligations.”).
101. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 12, at 11.
102. See Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1051 (11th Cir. 2004)
(applying the two-part Brooke Group test for predatory pricing).
103. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 12, at 28.
104. Id.
105. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1990).
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equally efficient rivals and thereby chill non-price competition.106
Exclusionary price squeezes may also entrench existing monopolies
by creating significant barriers to entry at two market levels, instead
107
of at just one. Although price squeezes can be procompetitive, their
effects may not always be benign.
B. Strengths & Weaknesses of linkLine’s Case
Although price squeezes can remain a useful, economically-sound
antitrust doctrine, linkLine’s allegations are replete with the flaws of
an earlier generation of antitrust thought. As its complaint correctly
alleges, price squeezes can be harmful to the competitive process and
to consumer welfare. Yet, linkLine’s allegations made no mention of
either particular harm to consumers or why price squeezes are
especially pernicious in the markets for broadband and DSL internet
access. The gravamen of its complaint focused on harm to itself as an
independent, profitable firm.108 linkLine did not cite specific harm to
competition or consumers, such as higher prices for DSL or
broadband service, or meaningful reduction in consumer choice, but
rather inferred harm to competition because it felt disadvantaged.109
Modern antitrust, however, is focused on preventing and deterring
110
harm to the broader competitive process. Individual plaintiffs are
granted relief only insofar as their claims are in furtherance of this
111
larger goal.
Like the Ninth Circuit, linkLine understated the institutional
difficulties that courts have when they adjudicate price squeeze
claims. Price squeezes are substantially more difficult to detect and to
remedy than predatory pricing. Predatory pricing requires that a court
determine whether the defendant’s prices are below an appropriate
measure of its costs—a question involving intense expert battles over
an appropriate measure of the defendant’s costs, but a question that

106. Id.
107. Id. at 24.
108. Brief in Opposition, supra note 81, at 10.
109. Id. at 4.
110. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
111. See, e.g., Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21–22 (1st Cir. 1990)
(“[A] practice is not ‘anticompetitive’ simply because it harms competitors. After all, almost all
business activity, desirable and undesirable alike, seeks to advance a firm’s fortunes at the
expense of its competitors. Rather, a practice is ‘anticompetitive’ only if it harms the
competitive process.”).
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ultimately has a yes-no answer. As then-Judge Breyer noted, price
squeezes require calculations of “fair prices” and “living profits.”112
Regulatory bodies are vastly more qualified to make these complex
economic and financial judgments than are judges and juries.
C. Likely Disposition
The Supreme Court will likely hold that price squeezing is not a
valid cause of action in partially-regulated industries. The existence of
regulatory oversight from the FCC greatly mitigates the need for
antitrust remedies to deter anticompetitive conduct. In unregulated
markets, however, dominant firms may be able to achieve
anticompetitive ends using price squeezes. In these markets, antitrust
scrutiny of pricing conduct, in spite of its imperfections, may be
necessary to preserve non-price competition and ease of entry for
new firms. Given the possibility that price squeezing can be
anticompetitive under certain circumstances and the Court’s prior
113
reluctance in Trinko to overturn decades-old precedent, the Court
in linkLine will likely issue a narrow holding and reject the call by a
group of prominent economic and legal scholars to hold that price
squeezes are always per se legal.114 Instead, the Court will probably
hold that price squeezing is per se legal in sectors with at least partial
regulatory oversight but that it still gives rise to Section 2 claims in
fully unregulated industries.

112. See id. at 25.
113. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).
Rather than overrule its prior duty-to-deal decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), the Court said that “Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer
boundary of § 2 liability.”
114. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in support of the
Petitioners at 8, Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2957 (Sep. 3, 2008)
(No. 07-512).

